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1 Backround of the research, relevance of the topic 
 
A constantly debated questions in economic theory are the questions of “hows? and whys?” of 
successful or unsuccessful economic development. It was the most important question of The 
early classical political economy: the title of the well-known book of Adam Smith was the 
Wealth of Nations. Later with the emergence of the neoclassical school of thought in 
economic theory the question became less important but after the second world war with the 
independency of many former colonies the question became adequate again. The development 
of countries in economic backwardness is one of the most important question of our highly 
globalized world economy. 
 
To study the questions of economic development in the developing world a new subfield of 
economic theory was created after the Second World War: development economics. Since 
then there has been a huge development in theories about economic development. But in 
different time periods different schools of thought were popular in the subfield with different 
focus point about the problems of developing nations. There are different classifications about 
these schools and eras (see for example Szentes (2011), Meier and Stiglitz (2000) or Todaro 
and Smith (2009)), but these various classifications show similarities. 
 
The figure below shows a possible classification of these different development theories with 
an emphasis on the dimension of time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The evolution of development economics (Source: own figure) 
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According to the figure in the time period of the classical development economics we can 
differentiate between the so called internalist and externalist schools. According to the 
internalist way of thinking the cause behind economic backwardness is some sort of internal 
problem, while according to the externalists the problem is the asymmetric relationship 
between the developing and developed nations. Beside these differences however we can 
point out one important similarity: the role of state intervention with industrial policies, 
mostly import substitution. From the 1970s, though, with the neoclassical counterrevolution 
liberalization and the retreat of the state became popular, but after the 1990s mostly because 
of the success stories of the Eastern Asian countries the new, institutional development 
theories emerged. 
 
The model of the developmental state became popular and got processed in the literature at 
the end of the 1980s and 1990s. The model sought an answer to the question, how the 
emerging nations of Eastern Asia got rich? However, most of the scientists agree on,  that it 
was a real development success story, the model itself, and the way of how these policies 
were carried out is still debated. In the economic literature debate is still about the importance 
and role of state intervention. Sociologists and other social scientists emphasize the role of 
history and culture. 
 
The four tigers of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong-Kong are the classical success stories 
of the developmental state. Some authors think about Japan as a developmental state (see 
Johnson 1982), however she was not a developing country. Later other countries of the region 
like Malaysia, Thailand showed major improvement and considered as developmental states. 
The literature began to discuss these stories after Johnsons work about Japan was published. 
Later on many other authors tried to describe the model of the developmental states and that is 
how it actually became a model in the development economics literature. In our dissertation 
we analyze the model of developmental states from a bit different point of view. 
 
The starting point of our dissertation is to actually understand what we can mean under the 
term developmental state? To achieve this goal we turn ourselves to the interanlists theories of 
development economics. The major theorists of the developmental state give us a detailed and 
empirical description of the model like the monograph of Johnson (1982) or the work of Alice 
Amsden (1989) or Robert Wade (1990). These writings are, according to Stubbs (2005), the 
state centered approach of the developmental state. According to this way of thinking the 
developmental state is successful way of a state led market economy. The state used selective 
industrial policy and a very disciplined macroeconomic policy. With these policies 
developmental state were able to achieve a high level of economic development. According to 
this approach we will define the developmental state as follows: 
1. A strategy of development policy which is based on the theory of the “big push” and 
import substituting industrialization (ISI). 
2. It is actually more than the simple internalist approach as the phase of ISI was 
developed further to an export promoting phase. That is a huge difference when we 
compare this strategy with other ones. 
3. And another point that is actually more than a question of economic policy making: 
the state was competent enough to promote sectors in which the country actually later 
had comparative advantage. There was no rent seeking by the public sector. The 
strategies were managed in the long run and the state had the capacity to maintain 
them even during recessions in the world economy. The state also had the ability to 
promote and encourage exports. 
To sum up: the model of developmental state is on the one hand a typical example of the 
internalist way of thinking in the classical and modern development economics. The industrial 
policy is part of the old-school internalist development economics, while the stable 
institutional system that enabled the state to carry out such a successful industrial policy is the 
part of the modern development theory. 
 
Accepting those means, that the concept of developmental state belongs to the internalist 
school of development economics. Building in the institutional theories improves our model 
further. However, when we think about the developmental state in a pour internalist approach 
we forget about one important thing. States are not in a vacuum but they are embedded into an 
international environment. The question is, if we should take into consideration this fact when 
we want to talk about the success of the developmental states. 
 
The ability of state to develop its economy might be constrained by external issues. In our 
dissertation we examine which are these constrains, and how do they influence these abilities 
of the state to promote development. That means that the hypothesis of our dissertation is, that 
the developmental state is a unique case in the world economy that was enabled by the 
external environment. With this we might add to the literature of developmental state by 
analyzing these external constrains and especially the effects of globalization. 
 
2 Used methods 
 
In the world economy from time to time international institutions emerge of which duty is to 
regulate states’ international relations. These institutions are called international regimes. The 
establishment and functioning of these regimes are examined by (beside other social sciences) 
the discipline of international political economy (IPE). Although the different schools of 
thought in IPE think about regimes very differently, one might say that there’s almost a 
consensus about the fact, that regimes are actually constrains on the behavior of single states 
in the world economy. 
 
The concept of international regimes was first used and defined by John Ruggie (1975). In our 
days however most scientist use the definition created by Krasner (1982: 186). According to 
this definition, “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice.” As we can see, regimes have four “ingredients”: principles, norms, rules 
and procedures. These ingredients are in a hierarchical relationship as according to Krasner 
the changes in rules and procedures are just changes inside the regime, however the changes 
in principles and norms change the regime itself. (ibid: 187) 
 
It is important to distinguish between regimes and international organizations. International 
organizations are a narrower concept than international regimes. International organizations 
are independent actors in the world economy while regimes are not. However there are 
regimes which actually are institutionalized in international organizations. One another 
important consequence of the definition mentioned above that when talking about 
international regimes we should consider them as institutions. The definition of international 
regimes rhymes with the definition of North (1990) of institutions: where institutions are 
formal and informal rules (norms of behavior) that involve their enforcements, too. 
 International political economy tries to understand states’ behavior in the international 
economic system. According to the theories of international regimes international regimes 
change countries behavior. In our little model created about regimes this behavior is our 
exogenous variable. On the other hand the independent variables are the structure of the 
international system, the relative power structure and the interest of the country. We think, 
that regimes actually modify the outcomes from this model (see the figure below!). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Causality in the model of regime theory (Source Krasner 1982: 189) 
 
International regimes are such institutions which actually influence states’ behavior in the 
international economic system. The question is why and how these institutions are 
established? What kind of motivations do states have when choosing to create or participate in 
regimes? 
 
As Kiss J. (2003) puts it about the theory of international relations (from which IPE’s schools 
of thought can be originated), during the second debate among the scientist of the discipline a 
common point of view emerged. According to this states can be examined as single actors 
behaving like “homo oeconomicus”, trying to maximize their utility which can be described 
as their power. They do it as competing actors in an international system without any 
sovereign actors beside states. Both of the two traditional schools of IPE, realism and 
liberalism accepts this kind of rationalist argument about states, and we will use it as a starting 
point about regime theory. 
 
Although both schools accept this rationalist argument there also mayor differences between 
them. The most important one is about the utility functions of the states. While realists think 
that the most important factor in states’ utility function is power, liberals think more carefully 
about this question. As realists think, states are concerned not just about the absolute gains 
from cooperation with other, but also about their relative gains: the gains compared with the 
gains of others. Liberals are concerned less about power issues, they talk about interest 
Independent 
variables 
Regimes Dependent variables 
(states’ behavior) 
instead of power. That means states are concerned more about the absolute gains from 
cooperation. These two schools are the rationalist branch of regime theory. 
 
As the already cited Kiss J. (2003) writes, the fourth debate in international relations theory 
was between these rationalist schools and the new post-modern approaches. Hasenclever et al 
(1997) call these approaches cognitivists as knowledge plays a very important role in these 
theories. 
 
Most of the cogitivists (the German authors cited above call them strong cognitivists) use 
instead of using the rationalists’ “homo oeconomicus” way of thinking the so called “homo 
sociologicus” model. According to Andorka (1997: 37) a “homo sociologicus” is someone 
who tries to learn and adhere himself to the norms of the society. Applying this model to 
countries means that states think not only about their power or interest according to a utility 
function, but their preferences actually change, they learn, adhere to international norms, and 
actually their behavior not only might be influenced by regimes, but regimes can change 
because of changes in countries behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A possible categorization of regime theories (Source: own figure) 
 
The categorization described above can be seen on the figure above. A more detailed 
categorization can be seen in the table below.  
 
 
Regime theories 
Rationalism Cognitivism 
(knowledge based) 
(Neo)realists 
(power based) 
(Neo)liberalism 
(interes based) 
Weak cognitivism Strong cognitivism 
(Homo sociologicus) 
  Realism Liberalism Cognitivism 
(strong) 
Central variable power interest knowledge 
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Meta-theoretical 
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concerned with 
absolute gains 
role-player 
Table 1: Categorization of regime theories (Source: Hasenclever – Mayer – Rittberger 1997: 
6) 
 
Analyzing table 1 we can divide regime theories into three groups: realism, liberalism, 
cognitivism. The most important difference between these groups is the central variable, 
which has the most important role explaining the construction and working of the regimes. 
According to realism and liberalism this central variable is two similar things. Realist are sure 
about that states try to maximize their power in the international system. That’s why they are 
concerned about the relative gains from their cooperation decision. In case of liberalism the 
central variable is a softer category: interest. That means that states are more concerned about 
the absolute gains from cooperation. According to the cognitivist approach of which central 
variable is knowledge and is based on the “homo sociologicus” approach we see a state that is 
trying to adopt itself to norms and rules of game and is therefore a role-player figure. Its 
decisions are based on the knowledge it got from decisions made earlier. 
 
Last but not least an important factor is the level of “institutionalism”. In this context it 
basically means how important is the role of regimes, how stable they are? According to 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997: 2) we can measure this with two possible variable: 
the effectiveness and robustness. Effectiveness is very static measure and covers two 
overlapping concept. First, a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its 
norms and rules. (This attribute of regimes is sometimes also referred to as “regime strength”) 
Second, a regime is effective to the extent that it achieves certain objectives or fulfills certain 
purposes. On the other hand the robustness of a regime is a more dynamic measure. “Regime 
robustness (resilience) refers to the "staying power" of international institutions in the face of 
exogenous challenges and to the extent to which prior institutional choices constrain 
collective decisions and behavior in later periods In other words, institutions that change with 
every shift of power among their members or whenever the most powerful participants find 
that their interests are no longer optimally served by the current regime, lack resilience.” 
(Hasenclever – Mayer – Rittberger (1997): 2, emphasis in the original) Realists are very 
pessimistic about regime effectiveness and robustness, while cognitivist are very optimistic. 
The liberals are somewhere in between the two other schools. 
 
To sum up the two most important way of thinking about regimes are rationalism and 
cognitivism. The former has two schools of thought: realism and liberalism. However they 
have differences but these differences are not exclusive but rather complementary. Both 
theory consider regimes as institutions that actually enhance cooperation. Liberalism 
emphasizes interest and starts from the position that cooperation is hard because of some sort 
of market failure. From this market imperfection uncertainty, distrust and increased level of 
transaction costs evolve and regimes are the tool to eliminate those. On the other hand realists 
are concerned about power issues. The question, if realists or liberals are right is merely a 
philosophical one, and might depend from the field of cooperation. 
 
The problem with liberal theories (and also realist ones) that they cannot explains, what is on 
the supply side of regimes. They can explain why regimes are needed, but not, who and who 
establish them. From this the so called hegemonic stability theory can amend the theory on 
the one hand, and on the other hand cognitivist theories might explain the supply side problem 
by introducing the role of knowledge. However, cognitivist theory cannot be easily fitted into 
a fictional compromised mega theory of international regimes.  
 
The different regime theories mentioned above cover two levels of analysis of international 
political economy. As Kenneth Waltz one leading theorists of international relations, one of 
the source of theories of international political economy puts it we might examine question of 
IPE on three different levels. (Cohen 2008: 120 – 121) The first level is the systemic level. 
The rationalist theories are handling this level. The third, deepest level of analysis is the 
cognitive level, the level of norms, ideas and knowledge. Cognitivists theories belong to this 
level. 
 
As we can see, a level of analysis is missing here. This is the second level, the so called 
domestic level, which is actually the level of interest groups. Traditional rationalist analysis 
sees the state as a black box: we don’t know from where its preferences are from, how its 
decisions are made. The domestic level of analysis opens up this box. Its analysis focuses on 
structures inside of the state: interest groups, political parties etc… and their impact on state 
interest. The idea is that states’ utility functions can be built up from the utility of the interests 
group functioning within the state. 
 
One of the largest deficiencies of regime theory is that it neglects interest groups. One of the 
small numbers of regime theories is the intergovernmentalist approach of Andrew Moravcsik 
(1991). However this theory is mostly applied to regional integrations, mostly to the European 
Union. 
 
Using the finding from above from the point of view our dissertation the following facts are 
relevant: 
 International regimes are principles, norms, and rules. There are institutions which 
influence states’ behavior in the international system, we call them international 
regimes. As we saw scientist are mostly agreed that regimes somehow influence 
states’ behavior. 
 Regime change is more than changing the rules of the regime. According to Krasner, 
regimes change if their norms and principles change. 
 There are different answers to the question why do regimes change? Power based 
theories say that actually it is the change in relative power structure that causes regime 
change. In this case states with more power or hegemonic powers introduce new 
regime, sometimes even by force. They do it in order to improve their position in the 
economic system and maximize their power. If we accept interest based theories we 
have harder thing to do if we want to understand regime changes. It is obvious that in 
that case we might talk about a change in the interest of the state. The question is what 
is interest? As we saw, maximizing interest isn’t so much different from maximizing 
power. The difference is that in case of liberal theories in the utility function of the 
state absolute gains from cooperation plays a larger role than relative gains. On the 
other hand in case of interest based theories domestic interest groups might play a role. 
And in case of cognitivist theories new knowledge, evolution of new norms and ideas 
can lead to a change in states’ behavior but also to the change of regimes. 
 The most important message of regime theories is that state policy is constrained by external 
institutions. We might think about regimes as external, or exogenous factors explaining states’ 
behavior, especially developing states who might want to introduce the model of the 
development state. When we talk about relative power structures, we might argue that 
developing or poor countries have less power than developed ones. There are some of which 
size and population are quite large and even abundant in natural resources but as they have 
less power than developed nation even their ability is circumscribed. But, some big 
developing nation such as China or India, or other BRIC countries might have the ability in 
the future to influence international regimes. 
 
In case of interest based theories power still plays a relative important role. On the other hand 
we might have an endogenity issue here as interest groups can be considered as endogenous. 
On the other hand, especially if we talk about weak states which cannot stay independent 
from the interest groups within the society, we might say, that this endogenity problem is 
solved: the interest groups are actually exogenous. Considering ideas, norms, knowledge, 
these are created by norm activists who are mostly individuals and therefore might be treated 
as exogenous. 
 
Therefore we can use the theories of international regimes as an analytical framework for our 
dissertation. We will think about globalization as changes in international regimes. We will 
examine how and why did regimes change in the world economy. After doing this analysis we 
show, how these changing regimes alter the possibilities of creating developmental states in 
the world economy. Therefore we will show, how globalization caused financial crisis in the 
Eastern Asian states, meaning that the traditional developmental state is incompatible with 
globalization. After that we show that in globalization another type of developmental states 
evolved: the Irish flexible developmental state. We will try to understand if this type of 
developmental state is really a developmental state? 
 
3 Results of the dissertation 
 
3.1 Changes in international regimes: causes and results 
 
We will analyze changes in the international trade regime and the international monetary and 
financial regime. We discuss these two because trade and financial policies were the key 
policy tools of the developmental state and other successful and unsuccessful development 
policies. 
 
When we take a look on the international trade system and analyze trade policies followed by 
different states and bilateral and multilateral treaties or even informal relations we can 
observe different time periods when these customs were the same. Kitson and Michie (1995) 
observe three such time periods from 1870 until today: until 1913 a relative liberal system can 
be observed underpinned by bilateral treaties and the lead of Great Britain. This was the era of 
the gold standard which was dominated by free trade. The time period between the two world 
wars was a more protectionist era, policy decisions by individual countries were 
uncoordinated. The time period after the second world war was the era of multilateral 
cooperation and gradual liberalization.  
 
However there are different approaches concerning the evolution of trade policy and trade 
regime. Baldwin and Martin (1999) and Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) introduce more time 
periods. According to these authors the era of free trade in the 19
th
 century began in 1846 with 
the abandonment of corn duties in England and the idea was spread by Britain after this 
decision. From the 1960s, and especially after the 1870s in many European countries 
protectionism became popular, especially in the new nation states, like Germany. The reason 
behind this was the growing agricultural import from overseas hurting European farmers and 
the evolving ideology behind industrialization and infant industry protection supported by 
economist like Friedrich List. 
 
The time period between the two world wars is considered by every expert as a highly 
protectionist era, but the authors cited above divide the time period after the second world war 
into two subperiods. According to Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) the first such period is the 
era from 1945 until the 1980s. During these decades international trade was rebuilt between 
developed nation, however liberalization was far from perfect among these countries. 
However developing nations followed mostly very protectionist trade policies using import 
substitution. The authors think about Eastern Asian states as countries that actually integrated 
it selves into the world economy, they admit, that even developmental states followed highly 
protectionist trade policies. (ibid: 493) From the 1980s but especially after the establishment 
of the WTO in 1995 a new liberalization began in the world economy. This time period might 
have ended however with the failure of the Doha Development Round. 
 
Looking through the history of the monetary and financial system we might find very similar 
time periods as we could find in connection with the trade system. Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2002b) examines the openness of financial markets and Eichengreen (2008) examines 
exchange rate mechanisms and they all find similar patterns in the evolution of the financial 
and monetary system. We can differentiate between four different time periods and the most 
important criterion is the used exchange rate system. 
 
The first time periods stretches from the second half of the 19
th
 century until the first world 
war and can be described by the exchange rate system of the gold standard. This era which 
was partially open considering trade was also a very liberal period considering capital flows 
and other financial relations. That’s why many scholars describes this period as the first wave 
of globalization. the financial system was a very integrated one, especially when we examine 
capital flows between colonial powers and their colonies. These extended capital flows were 
enabled by the gold standard. 
 
As we could observe problems in the trading system we could observe the same in the 
financial system in the interwar period. Most of the leading nations tried to reintroduce the 
gold standard however that was only a partial success. The new system, the so called gold 
bullion standard was used only for a short period of time. The most important reason behind 
that was that monetary policy became subordinated to domestic economic policy. Therefore 
without an enforcer financial crises and exchange rate crises happened quite often and 
therefore countries began to introduce capital controls (Obstfeld – Taylor 2002a: 5).  
 
The next stage was the era of the Bretton Woods system. The system used until the 1970s was 
an exchange rate system built on pegged exchange rates. The US dollar and gold were the 
lead. But as the need for an independent monetary policy still played an important role capital 
controls had to be introduced. To stabilize the system an international organization was 
needed and the International Monetary Fund was established. But after the gradual 
liberalization of the financial flows in the 1960s the weaknesses of the system became clear 
and the exchange rate system collapsed in the 1970s. (Obstfeld – Taylor 2002a: 6) 
 
The last time period began in the 1970s and we are still living in it. In the developed nations 
the pegged exchange rates were replaced by floating ones. Therefore with the liberalization of 
capital flows governments still can have autonomous monetary policy. In the developing 
world however many countries still maintain pegged exchange rates. Capital flows increased 
to many developing countries, especially at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s which were followed by many financial crises. Overall the openness of the financial 
systems increased significantly. 
 
When analyzing regime changes we write about the regimes created in Bretton Woods as 
developmental states started their success stories during this period. After that we describe 
how these regimes changed in the 1970s. 
 
In the regimes of Bretton Woods liberalization was subordinated to internal stability and goals 
of economic policies. The rules created in Bretton Wood were built on norms and principles 
that served these goals. The main principle behind the Bretton Woods regimes was Keynesian 
economics that legitimized state intervention into the economy. The leading norm of Bretton 
Woods was embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982) according to what liberalization and 
cooperation in the world economy were only desired goals if home equilibrium was reached. 
These norms and principles actually enabled developing nations to adopt interventionist 
development policies: the external conditions were perfect to establish the model of 
developmental state. 
 
Bretton Woods and its regimes were actually a special product of a very special time period. 
First of all it was the product of the movement away from the liberalized economy built to the 
concept of the self-regulated market (Polányi 2004). As in society dissatisfaction against the 
self-regulating market evolves automatically, interest groups try to introduce new rules that 
regulate markets. New norms evolve against self-regulating markets. Bretton Woods is 
actually a compromise with capitalism. 
 
The economic system of Bretton Woods on the other hand was the product of a negotiation 
process dominated by American hegemony. According to the rationalist theories of 
international regimes there might be states with relative larger power that try to influence 
regimes. As the United States was the hegemonic power of the Bretton Woods era, the system 
mirrored her interests. As Arrighi and Silver (2008) show, the United States as a relatively 
large and closed country was interested in a more closed international system. But, as Stubbs 
(2005) writes it, the regimes built on the concept of embedded liberalism made it possible to 
the United States to successfully help allied developing nations with unilateral preferences in 
trade and finance. Letting these countries to industrialize was a tool to make them stay in the 
capitalist world. 
 
Then something has changed, the regimes established in Bretton Woods has begun to change. 
New norms and principles emerged: with monetarists and new classical economics the 
legitimacy of state intervention vanished, the belief that liberalization is the best solution for 
everybody came back and became the leading schools of thought. Norms have changed also 
as international organizations began to promote liberal policies, especially with the diffusion 
of the norm of the so called Washington Consensus. Things have begun to point toward a 
more liberal and globalized world economy. 
 
3.2 The effect of globalization on the developmental state 
 
We show the effect of globalization on the developmental state by using two case studies. 
Although the model of developmental state was already in danger at the beginning of the 
1990s, it became clear only with the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis of Eastern 
Asia in 1997. The collapse of these countries came as a surprise for economists as Eastern 
Asian nations were the success stories of economic development. We have to the questions: 
what were the underlying causes of this financial collapse and what are the effects of the crisis 
on the developmental state? 
Ma már külföldi és magyar tanulmányok (lásd például Radelet és Sachs 1998, és Benczes 
2000d, valamint 2003.) is egyetértenek abban, hogy a pénzügyi összeomlás közvetett kiváltó 
oka a távol-keleti gazdaságok környezetének átalakulása, és ezzel kapcsolatosan az 
alkalmazott gazdaságpolitikák átalakulása volt. Az 1990-es évek elején végleg beléptünk a 
felgyorsult globalizáció korába, ennek következtében pedig a kelet-ázsiai fejlesztő államok is 
nyitottabbakká váltak mind kereskedelemi, mind pedig pénzügyi szempontból. 
Nowadays foreign and Hungarian literatures (see for example Radelet and Sachs 1998, and 
Benczes 2000 and 2003) are agreed that the main cause leading to financial crisis was the 
transformation of the economic environment surrounding the developmental states. This 
change actually altered the used economic policies of the countries. The most remarkable 
change could be observed in the financial system as with globalization it opened up quite fast. 
The same could be observed in the trading system. 
 
However this liberalization process was very dangerous. In the past the financial markets of 
the traditional developmental states were closed, therefore it made possible that unique 
institutional solution were developed in these markets. The banking sector was distorted by 
state intervention, the possibility of bail-outs led to the emergence of moral hazard. That’s 
why the financial collapse could happen in 1997. 
 
We can follow what happened in the figure below (Benczes 2003). The special institutions of 
the financial systems of the Eastern Asian states could not adopt themselves to the challenges 
coming from the highly globalized financial markets. States owned a quite limited amount of 
capital during their development period. After opening up the financial markets capital 
overflowed these states. As financial institutions were unable to cope with this huge amount 
of capital, financial bubbles were created. This can be illustrated by moving from cell 1 to cell 
3 in our figure and this is actually a dead end. The correct way of development would have 
been led from cell 1 to cell 2 by the establishment of new institutions and then to cell 4 by 
liberalization. 
 
  Alacsony tőke/beruházási 
lehetőség ráta 
Magas tőke/beruházási 
lehetőségek ráta 
Fejletlen intézményes alapok (1) Fejlesztő állam modellje (3) Egyik sem 
Fejlett intézményes alapok (2) Mindkettő (4) Piac által vezérelt 
vegyesgazdaság 
 
Figure 4: The financial crisis in Eastern Asia. The two possible scenarios (from cell 1 to 3 and 
from cell 1 to cell 2 and than to cell 4) are indicated with different types of arrows. (Source: 
Benczes (2003: 59)) 
 
The question is whether after the financial collapse of the developmental states we still can 
talk about the model of developmental states? There are many different opinions about this 
(see Shin 2000, Jomo 2001 and Beeson 2003). What we surely can observe is some kind of 
institutional transition. The typical form of industrial activity in Korea, the chaebol is being 
transformed to multinational corporation. State intervention is changing. If that means, that 
the traditional model of the developmental state is vanishing is a very hard question and might 
be answered by studying other developmental state like countries, like Ireland. 
 
During the 1990s beside the Tigers in Asia a new success story began its way to become a 
hyped role model for economist: Ireland. From the early 1990s Ireland showed a very high 
level a GDP growth and only the former Asian tigers performances could have competed with 
this: that is why economists began to talk about the Celtic Tiger. However the comparison can 
be justified not just by the high level of growth but also by the role of state intervention. So 
Ireland got not just the name Tiger, but also some economists began to talk about Ireland as a 
developmental state. The Irish model is widely discussed in the foreign and Hungarian 
literature (see O’Riain 2000, Kirby 2002 és 2009, Farkas 1999, Artner 2000, Hajós 2006, and 
Nagy 1999). We briefly sum up these explanations and then we try to evaluate if the Irish 
state is actually a developmental one? 
 
When we are trying to compare the Irish model with the Asian ones we can observe lot of 
similarities, but also differences. And most of the differences are stemming from 
globalization. The firs similarity is the role of state intervention. Both models did that by 
using bureaucratic agencies. However in the Asian countries this was done by the method that 
Wade (1991) called governing the market: price distortions, interventions in the financial 
system and trade barriers, whilst in Ireland state intervention meant tax reductions, subsidies 
and creation of free trade zones and industrial parks (more market friendly approaches). In 
Asia economic development was achieved by domestic companies working together with the 
state. In Ireland economic development was achieved by attracting foreign companies and by 
bounding these foreign companies with domestic suppliers. 
 
Bureaucratic agencies in both cases were embedded into the economy as an agent of the state, 
though they remained autonomous from the private sector. However in case of Asia the 
private sector was dominated by domestic firms, but in Ireland the private sector actually was 
dominated by foreign, mostly American transnational companies. 
 
That means that embedded autonomy is another common point in both models. That’s why 
for instance O’Riain calls the Irish model developmental state. It is very important to see, 
however, that the level of this embedded autonomy (especially the level of autonomy) is 
different in the two cases. As the Eastern Asian economies were closed and therefore they had 
very limited contacts with the world economy, the Irish model is based on an open economy. 
Because of this Asian governments had larger space to maneuver while the possibilities of the 
Irish government are more limited. 
 
The Irish bureaucratic agency that is responsible for attracting foreign firms into the country, 
IDA is one of the most important government agency in Ireland. When negotiating with a 
foreign firm that is seeking new place to produce something the ability of remaining 
autonomous is very little, as other countries are certainly trying to attract the same firm as 
well. And as decisions of foreign owned firms are usually made in another country the 
influence of state on the already working companies is also much lower than in case of Asia. 
 
Another similarity is selectivity. Both the Irish and Asian developmental states used selective 
industrial policies. However there are differences too. The Asian nations used trade policies, 
financial policies to select certain industries to promote. In case of Ireland the selection was 
done among industries and foreign firms. It made a difference in which industry a foreign 
company was involved and only those were attracted to Ireland that fitted with the 
government’s goals. 
 
There further similarities as well. One important factor was political stability. in case of 
Ireland it was achieved by tripartite treaties where labor, capital and the state agreed on 
important questions like wages, taxes. In Asia political stability was achieved by dictatorship. 
What is important is that political stability also led to macroeconomic stability. The 
investment into human capital is also a similarity. In both model the promotion of education 
played a crucial role. And last but not least external factors, especially financing played an 
important role. in case of Asia the aid from the United States was such a factor while in 
Ireland the role of EU funds was remarkable. 
 
To evaluate whether we might talk about a developmental state in case of Ireland we might 
analyze five factors (Kirby 2009): 
1. The first question is if the economic growth in case of Ireland could be evaluated as 
real development? As Kirby shows it (Kirby 2009: 13) despite of high level of growth 
the social expenditure in Ireland remained on a moderate level, while income 
inequality remained quite high. Public spending on education and health (despite a lot 
of educational programs) remained also quite low. From that we might argue that the 
growth wasn’t entirely converted into development. 
2. The reliance on FDI and path dependency of Ireland is another interesting question. As 
Bradley (2002) puts it in his work, the Irish industrial policy was actually 
“industrialization by invitation”. That’s why it is very hard to rely more on the 
domestic sectors. For example most of the Irish R&D is actually coming from the 
United States and the benefits of all those innovations are going back there. According 
to him Ireland is still a technologically follower country. 
3. The third point is the role of political ideology. Fitz Gerald (cited by Kirby 2009) 
shows that because of the election system during elections political debates are carried 
out on a micro level. That leads to the depoliticization of macro level politics. 
Developmental policies are not influenced by ideological debates, economic policy is 
carried out by technocrats and pragmatists sitting in the governmental agencies. 
4. Because of this highly professional and ideology free decision making bureaucrats are 
the ones that make the decision. However there is a dark side of this process: the Irish 
state is fragmentating because of that. For every new exercise new agencies are 
established. Therefore the number of these institutions are increasing and that’s make 
it harder to govern the economy in this fragmented structure. 
5. That brings us back to the question of level of autonomy. As we saw the level of 
autonomy of the Irish state is significantly lower than in case of Eastern Asia. 
To sum up the most important finding from the case studies: according to our view the so 
called flexible developmental state of Ireland could fix the problem of the Asian type of 
developmental state that is adopts itself quicker to the challenges from globalization. However 
with this openness the effectiveness of the Irish state is decreasing as the level of its autonomy 
is significant lower. Another problem is that the Irish state cannot channel the benefits of 
growth into the society and turn growth into development. The economic crisis of 2008 shows 
also that even a very flexible state cannot adopt itself to large turbulences from the world 
economy. Thus, serious economic shocks can actually ruin the past benefits from 
development. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In our days we are living in a highly globalized world. Rodrik (2005) defines globalization as 
the decreasing of the barriers in the way of transnational connections. These barriers are 
actually transaction cost for transnational economic relations. This definition means that 
liberalization contributes to the acceleration of the globalization process. Although these 
transaction costs are not fully eliminated in the world economy there is a growing demand for 
further reduction. 
 
The question is what will happen with the model of the developmental state in this situation? 
To conclude we have to examine two aspects of globalization process. The first one is the 
question of policy space of industrial policy. One can argue that with the globalization process 
the possibilities of using industrial policy tools are decreasing. This fear comes from the 
changing trading and monetary system. 
 
Emerging countries in the world economy always used some kind of selective industrial 
policy. In case of Korea and Taiwan these tools were trade policy, the distortion of the 
financial system, barriers on foreign investment and capital flows. Using these tools are in 
today’s world economy quite hard. The rules of the WTO for example make it less possible to 
use trade restriction and capital controls. Many countries in the 1990s began to use exchange 
rate policy as an industrial policy tool. However pressures from developed countries, 
especially from the United State make it less and less possible to use undervalued pegged 
exchange rates. 
 
Beside the policy space issue the other problem is the pressure on convergence of different 
non-market institutions. Using Dani Rodrik’s unholy trinity model of global politics we have 
shown two important changes considering developmental states. The first one was in 
connection with the Asian financial crisis: in a globalized world economy the institutions of 
the classical developmental state cannot work properly and cause economic crisis. A 
transformation of the institutions is needed. The reason behind this that globalization cannot 
work in a world economy with diversified non-market institutions. 
 
The second problem emerges from the first one mentioned above. Because of globalization 
and the absence of proper global governance institutions we end up in the situation called by 
Rodrik golden straitjacket. The world of global straitjacket is very similar to the world of gold 
standard. During the time period of the gold standard economic policy could have only one 
goal: to maintain the stability of the pegged exchange rate. According to Rodrik in our time 
we end up in a world economy similar to that except that governments role is to adopt the 
county’s institutions to the challenges from globalization. However this picture needs to be 
modified because of what we could observe in the case study about Ireland. 
 
However O’Riain calls the Irish development model as flexible developmental state, we might 
argue that the Irish model is more alike to what Cerny (2000, and Cerny et al 2005) calls 
competition state. The competition state is not necessary a smaller state than the earlier ideal 
types of states like the developmental state or the welfare state. But the functions of state have 
been undergone over a severe change. The competition state lose the functions concerning the 
maintenance of full employment, achieving social goals by redistributions and other social 
political functions. Instead of that these functions should be carried out by the market. 
 
However new state functions emerge. A very important function of the competition state is to 
enhance business activities through privatization, liberalization. An important function is the 
attraction of foreign capital. The consequence of that is not deregulation as frequently argued 
but re-regulation. However these new forms of regulations are foster market function and 
therefore we might call them “pro-market re-regulation”. (Cerny et al 2005: 17) 
 
That means that there is still economic policy in our times: and that’s why we might argue 
that the situation today is different from the one during the gold standard. However states 
have to forfeit some aspects of their economic policies. The most important and maybe most 
painful part is social and welfare policies. Although in case of the classical developmental 
state we cannot observe a formal welfare state but the results of growth were distributed 
among the members of the society. With that income inequalities remained quite low. In case 
of Ireland, however, as we saw this was not true and that is because of that Ireland in more 
like a competition state as a developmental state. 
 
On the other hand the developmental policies of countries change intensively. In case of 
Korea and Taiwan mostly internal actors of the economy were the subject of development 
policies. Today many important actors that influence the development of a country are 
transnational actors. These new actors need new tools of developmental policies and of course 
respond less to initiatives coming from these policies. 
 
However that doesn’t mean that open developmental or competition states do not have 
development policies. The tools of attracting foreign companies are used quite intensively by 
this type of states. But beside of tax reductions and subsidies other policy tools should be used 
to attract foreign companies. Therefore the competition state develops its educational system, 
domestic industrial sectors to become suppliers to multinationals. All of these functions are 
carried out embedded into the economy so the right policy tools would be chosen. Just like in 
case of Ireland. 
 
However these functions do not need to be so diverse in different countries. Therefore we can 
see the convergence process among non-market institutions of states that was shown by 
Rodrik in his model. We can observe how politics have become uniform as the differences 
between right and left have decreased. That is one we saw in case of Ireland: macro level 
politics became highly professionalized. On the other hand Cerny et al. (2005) show how 
varieties of capitalism vanish in the world economy with this convergence process. 
 
As Cerny and co-authors put it (2005) the time period of embedded liberalism was replaced 
by embedded neoliberalism. in this case neoliberalism is not the schools of thought discussed 
in chapter 3, neoliberal institutionalism. Here, neoliberalism is the norm emerging in the 
1970s and 1980s. So we can change Rodrik’s model as following. Instead of Bretton Woods 
compromise we might use embedded liberalism. This embedded liberalism made it possible to 
establish the model of developmental state. And instead of using the term golden straitjacket 
we can talk about embedded neoliberalism. Embedded neoliberalism is the playing field of 
the competition state. 
 
 Figure 5: The unholy trinity of global politics, modified (Source: Rodrik (2005) own 
modification) 
 
To conclude we can answer the question asked at the beginning of our dissertation. We can 
conclude that the developmental state is a development policy model that could be used in 
less globalized world economy. However the model of developmental state does not vanish 
entirely as another model of state intervention emerged with globalization: the competition 
state. The competition state inherited many characteristics of the developmental state. 
However one important ingredient is missing: the ability to transform growth into 
development. And that is because the competition state does not have the capability to 
conduct social policy. So we can conclude that the external environment was a very important 
factor in the success of the developmental state, but the model partially live further in the 
world economy. 
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